The anti-religious tendency of contemporary philosophical thought is strengthened by the logical positivistic criterion of meaningfulness, according to which the language of religion is nonsensical and absurd. in common with the logical positivists, professor braithwaite holds that, of all the three conditions by which the truth of a statement can be determined, religious discourse does not fulfill any. it is asserted, accordingly, that religious language is either anthropomorphic or it means nothing. the article subjects the criterion of meaningfulness to a (...) searching analysis and exposes its hollowness. it is contended that all that the logical positivists can say, on the basis of the criterion, is that the language of religion is neither tautologous nor descriptive, but the further conclusion that it is meaningless is, to use legal terminology, excessive. it is also argued that the dilemma posed above can be "escaped." the meaningfulness of the religious language can be discovered in the context of analogy, obedience, and encounter. (shrink)

Preface.--1. The general nature of reality.--2. The problems of theism.--3. Free will.--4. The problem of good.--5. The ethics of the gospels.--6. The ethics of Nietzsche.--7. The optimism of Browning and Meredith.

Professor Harry Frankfurt has made a distinction between what he calls first-order desires, such as a desire for a Porsche, and second-order desires, such as a desire to desire a Porsche. He claims that this analysis of the structure of the will can provide an account of free human action. I argue against Frankfurt as follows: First, his account does not really free our wills, but only binds our wills at successively higher levels of desire; second, there is no good (...) reason to think that desires of any level higher than second exist; and third, critical review of one's desires necessarily involves the idea of an ought, and is thus not really a second-order desire at all. Rightly understood, all "higher-order" critical review of one's desires occurs at a single "level" of review, contrary to what Frankfurt believes, and this fact makes room for the theory of agency. (shrink)